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ABSTRACT
This article proposes a theory of watermarking security based on a cryptanalysis point of view. The main
idea is that information about the secret key leaks from the observations, for instance watermarked pieces of
content, available to the opponent. Tools from information theory (Shannon’s mutual information and Fisher’s
information matrix) can measure this leakage of information. The security level is then defined as the number
of observations the attacker needs to successfully estimate the secret key. This theory is applied to common
watermarking methods: the substitutive scheme and spread spectrum based techniques. Their security levels
are calculated against three kinds of attack.
Keywords: W atermarking, Security, Equivocation, Fisher information matrix.
1. INTRODUCTION
Digital watermarking studies have always been driven by the improvement of robustness. Most of articles of this
field deal with this criterion, presenting more and more impressive experimental assessments. Some key events
in this quest are the use of spread spectrum [1], the invention of resynchronization schemes [2], the discovery of
side information channel [3, 4], and the formulation of the opponent actions as a game [5].
On the contrary, security received little attention in the watermarking community. The first difficulty is that
security and robustness are neighboring concepts, which are hardly perceived as different. The intentionality
behind the attack is not enough to make a clear cut between these two concepts. An image compression is
clearly an attack related to robustness, but it might happen intentionally, i.e. with the purpose of removing
the watermark, or not. Robust watermarking is defined in [6] as a communication channel multiplexed into
original content in a non-perceptible way, and whose “capacity degrades as a smooth function of the degradation
of the marked content”. We add that the degradation is due to a classical content processing (compression,
low-pass filtering, noise addition, geometric attack . . . ). The attacker has three known strategies to defeat
watermark robustness: to remove enough watermark signal energy, to jam the hidden communication channel,
or to desynchronize the watermarked content.
T. Kalker then defines watermarking security as “the inability by unauthorized users to access [i.e. to remove,
to read, or to write the hidden message] the communication channel” established by a robust watermarking.
Security deals with intentional attacks whose aims are not only the removal of the watermark signal, excluding
those already encompassed in the robustness category since the watermarking technique is assumed to be robust.
Some seminal works have already warned the watermarking community that digital watermarking may not
be a secure primitive (i.e., a tool providing information security) despite its robustness. However, they only deal
with dedicated attacks relevant to particular applications. The deadlock attack concerns copyright protection
and illustrates the impossibility to prevent somebody to watermark content with his own technique and key
(by embedding a watermark signal or by creating a fake original) [7]. This ruins the identification of the owner
because two watermarking channels interfere in the same piece of content. Multiple problems in the field of
copyright protection and authentication stems from the copy attack, where the attacker first copies a watermark
and then pastes it in a different piece of content [8].
We do not include these two last attacks in our study because they pertain to the protocol layer, in the sense
that it questions the link between the presence (or absence) of watermark and the signification at the application
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layer. We believe that these attacks stem from a misunderstanding of the watermark designers about the targeted
application. In copyright protection, the presence of a watermark has no legal value. The only receivable proof
is the belonging of the content to the database of a trusted third party (ie., an author society). The authors
must register their works in this database in order to be protected. It is absolutely useless, from a legal point of
view, for the authors to watermark their works on their own. If watermarking is used in copyright protection,
it will be embedded by the trusted third party during the registration process. Moreover, it will certainly be a
function of a registration number. We show here that the deadlock attack is technically feasible, but it has no
reality once one knows the framework of the application. In the same way, the copy attack is now a nonsense
in authentication application. It is true that the very first watermarking authentication schemes were using a
constant watermark. But, nowadays, it is well established that the watermark must depends on the original
content like a digital signature in cryptography.
We are more interested here in threats decoupled from the applications. The oracle attack (aka sensitivity
attack) is a threat whenever the opponent has access to a watermarking detector (as in copy protection for
consumer electronics devices [9], for instance). The attacker first estimates the secret key, testing the detection
process on different pieces of content [10]; this disclosure then helps him forging pirated content. Note that in
this last case, the number of detection tries is of utmost importance. The watermark designer would like this
number to be so huge that the attack lasts too much time. For instance, around Nv tries are necessary for a
Direct Spread Spectrum Sequence watermarking scheme [10], whereas around Nv
2 tries are needed for known
asymmetric schemes [11].
Articles proposing a complete analysis of robust watermarking security are extremely rare. The authors
are only aware of the pioneer work [12], where two digital modulation schemes achieve perfect secrecy, and
more recent works sketching a general framework for security analysis [11, 13]. The main idea is here to adapt
Shannon’s definition of cryptography security to watermarking. At the beginning of the game, the watermarker
selects a watermarking technique and picks up randomly a private key. According to the Kerckhoffs’s principle,
the opponent knows the selected algorithm but not the private key. Then, the watermarker starts producing
some marked pieces of content. The opponent has access to some observations and his aim is to estimate the
private key. The main idea of Shannon’s theory is that information about the private key might leak from
the observations. Hence, the a posteriori uncertainty of the opponent decreases as he makes more and more
observations. However, the above-mentioned works have only translated the cryptanalysis methodology into
watermarking terminology.
The goal of this article is to offer a complete and workable theory of watermarking security. It completes
Barni’s et al. approach, assessing for the really first time security levels of substitution, and spread spectrum
based techniques. For this purpose, the first section summarizes the methodology and introduces the basic
notation. Measurement of the information leakages are based on Shannon’s mutual information for a substitutive
watermarking method in section 3 and on Fisher’s information for a spread spectrum based watermarking method
in section 4. This measure is also used for SCS analysis. This yields estimation of security levels for three types
of attack. Yet, these information theory tools do not reveal any insight for practical hacking. Part Two tackles
this algorithmic issue.
2. METHODOLOGY
2.1. Notation
Let us first list some notational conventions used in this paper. Vectors are sets in bold font, matrices in
calligraphic font, and sets in black board font. Data are written in small letters, and random variables in capital
ones. The length of the vectors considered in this paper is Nv: x(i) is the i-th component of vector x. The
probability density function of random variable X (or its probability mass function if X is discrete) is denoted
by pX(.). Hidden messages have Nc bits and secret keys are usually composed of Nc elements (e.g. Nc secret
carriers in the spread spectrum case). Finally, No vectors are considered: x
No = {xj}Noj=1 represent this collection
of vectors and xj is the vector x associated to the j-th observation.
2.2. The cryptanalytic approach
The methodology presented in this section is clearly inspired by the cryptanalysis. It has already been presented
in [13], and is based on three key articles: Kerckhoffs [14], Shannon [15] and Diffie-Hellman [16]. We first briefly
present these concepts, before formalizing them in the following subsections.
2.2.1. Kerckhoffs’ principle.
A. Kerckhoffs stated in 1883 that keeping an encryption algorithm secret for years is not realistic [14], and this
principle is now used in any cryptanalytic study. In watermarking, the situation is similar, and it is assumed that
the opponent knows the watermarking algorithm. Hence, for a given design and implementation of an algorithm,
the security stems from the secrecy of the key. The designer’s challenge is: “Am I sure that an opponent will
not exploit some weaknesses of the algorithm to disclose the secret key?”. In practice, it doesn’t mean that
watermark designers must disclose their algorithm. It only says that the secrecy by obscurity (non disclosing the
algorithm as a defense against hacking) cannot be measured by any means, and it is consequently non reliable.
When an expert assesses the security level of a scheme (be it a crypto-system or watermarking technique), he
plays the role of a pirate who has somehow disclosed the algorithm.
What does Kerckhoffs’ principle imply? Watermarking processes are often split into three functions. The first
one extracts some features from content (issued by a classical transform, such as DCT, wavelet, FFT, Fourier
Mellin, . . . ), which are stored in a so-called extracted vector. The second one mixes the extracted vector with the
secret watermark signal, giving a watermarked vector. Then, an insertion function reverses the extraction process
to come back in the original world, putting out the watermarked document. Fig. 1 illustrates the embedding
process. The detection follows an analogous process as sketched in Fig. 2. According to the Kerckhoffs’ principle,
the opponent knows all the involved functions. He thus observes the watermarked vectors from contents he has
access to, because the extraction function has no secret parameter.
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Figure 2. Global point of view of the detection process
2.2.2. Shannon’s approach
The methodology that Shannon exposed for studying the security of encryption schemes is here transposed to
watermarking. The embedder has randomly picked up a secret key, and he used it to watermark several pieces
of content. The opponent observes these pieces of watermarked content, all related to the same secret key but
hiding different messages. The watermarking technique is perfectly secure if and only if no information about
the secret key leaks from the observations. If it is not the case, the security level is defined as the number of
observations which are needed to disclose the secret key, or to estimate it with enough accuracy. The bigger the
information leakage is, the smaller the security level of the watermarking scheme will be.
2.2.3. Diffie-Hellman’s terminology
Reference [16] is one of the most well known articles in cryptography as it strikes the creation of new directions
such as public key cryptography and digital signature. It is also, as far as the authors know, the first time
where several contexts of attack are envisaged according to the kinds of data observed by the opponent. In
watermarking, the adversary has at least access to watermarked content, but, in some cases, he might also
observe the hidden messages (for instance, the name of the author in copyright protection or the status of a
movie in copy protection) or the original data (for instance, DVD movies are watermarked for copy protection;
but original version of old movies were not protected). This implies that a security level is assessed for a given
context. In this article, we study:
• the Watermarked Only Attack (WOA), in which the opponent only has access to No watermarked vectors
yNo ;
• the Known Message Attack (KMA), in which the opponent only has access to No watermarked vectors and
the associate messages (y,m)No ;
• the Known Original Attack (KOA), in which the opponent only has access to No watermarked vectors and
the corresponding original ones (y,x)No .
The reader might be surprised that the KOA context deserves any attention. Seemingly, there is no need to
attack watermarked content when one has the original version. The pirate does not hack these pieces of content,
but his goal is to gain information about the secret key, in order to, later on, hack different pieces of content
watermarked with the same key.
Other contexts, not studied in this article, will certainly deserve a proper study in the future.
• the Estimated Original Attack, in which the opponent has access to original content but at a lower quality
than the watermarked versions. Are small pictures in thumbnail gallery or movies trailers watermarked?
Another possibility is that the opponent denoizes watermarked content to estimate its original version.
• the Multiple Embedding Single Original Attack, in which the opponent has access to several watermarked
versions of the same content with different hidden messages. Collusion in fingerprinting and tracing traitors
applications is tackled here. However, the collusion attack (ie., the process made by the group of colluders)
is not reduced here to a simple average of the multiple watermarked version. A proper study must reveal
whether a more powerful attack exists in order to assess the security level of fingerprinting schemes.
• the Multiple Embedding Multiple Original Attack, in which the opponent has access to several watermarked
versions (each) of some originals. Fingerprinting of movies (ie., several video blocks) is tackled here.
2.3. Perfect covering
Although cryptographic encryption and watermarking are two different security primitives, they might look like
the same at first sight. Fig. 3 illustrates this analogy investigated in this subsection. Shannon defined perfect
secrecy of a crypto-system by the inability of opponents to refine the probability distribution of plaintexts m by
observing related cipher texts, all encrypted by key k. We adapt this definition to watermarking, stating that
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Figure 3. An analogy with cryptography: plaintext m → watermark w, key k → original x, ciphertext c → watermarked
content y.
the most important thing to be hidden is the watermark signal, and not the original content. The equivalent of
the plaintext is, here, the watermark signal.
Definition 2.1. A watermark embedding makes a perfect covering if
pW(w) = pW(w|y) for any (y,w). (1)
This means that in a perfect covering scheme, the observations of only watermarked pieces of contents will
never reveal any information on the watermark signal: I(Y;W) = 0. Whenever K → W → Y is a Markov
chain, I(Y;W) ≥ I(Y;K) holds. Consequently, perfect covering implies perfect secrecy.
Shannon has easily found a necessary condition to get perfect secrecy, by using his information theory tools:
H(M) ≤ H(K), where H(.) denotes the entropy, that is, H(M) = −∑m p(m) log p(m). Yet, the same proof
yields the following necessary condition to get perfect covering: H(W) ≤ H(X). This deeply reveals the difference
between cryptography and watermarking. As suggested by the greek word κρυπτω (meaning “I hide”), the role
of the secret key is, in encryption, to hide the meaning of the plaintext. Hence, its entropy should be greater
or equal to the one of the plaintext. Whereas steganography (στεγανω means “I cover”) hides the watermark
covered by the host signal.
2.4. Measure of information leakages and physical interpretation
If a watermarking scheme does not provide perfect secrecy, then one would like to measure the information
leakage about the secret key. For this purpose, this subsection presents several tools from information theory,
which will later be useful to analyze classical watermarking schemes.
2.4.1. Shannon’s measure
In the case where the secret key K is a discrete variable, the entropy H(K) measures the uncertainty (ie., the
ignorance of the opponent) on the true value of k. When he makes some observations ONo , his uncertainty is
now evaluated through a conditional entropy, which Shannon has named equivocation: H(K|ONo) = H(K) −
I(K;ONo). The information leakage is measured by the mutual information between the observations and the
secret key. The bigger the information leakage is, the smaller the uncertainty of the opponent. Equivocation is
a non increasing function with No. It goes from H(K), ideally down to 0. When it becomes null, this means
that the opponent has enough observations to uniquely determine the secret key. Shannon defined the unicity
distance as the first value of No for which the equivocation becomes null. It means that while the number of
observations is increasing up to the unicity distance, the set of possible secret keys is reducing down to only one
element. This is a way to measure the security level No
? of a primitive.
Unfortunately, these tools might not be suitable for any watermarking scheme. It is well known that entropy
(or conditional entropy) of a continuous random variable does not measure a quantity of information. Mutual
information I(K;ONo) is always pertinent as a measure of information leakages; but the physical interpretation
of the equivocation as the remaining uncertainty does not hold when the secret key is regarded as a continuous
random variable as in section 4. For instance, the equivocation can take positive or non positive values, ruining
the concept of unicity distance.
2.4.2. Fisher’s measure
This is the reason why another information measurement is proposed. In statistics, Fisher was one of the first
to introduce the measure of the amount of information supplied by the observations about an unknown to be
estimated parameter. Suppose observation O is a random variable with a probability distribution function
depending on a parameter vector θ. The Fisher Information Matrix (FIM) concerning θ is defined as
FIM(θ) = EψψT with ψ = ∇θ log pO(o;θ), (2)
where E is the mathematical expectation operator and ∇θ is the gradient vector operator defined by ∇θ =
(∂/∂θ(1), . . . , ∂/∂θ(Nθ))
T . The Cramér-Rao theorem gives a lower bound of the covariance matrix of an unbiaised
estimator of parameter vector θ whenever the FIM is invertible:
Rˆθ ≥ FIM(θ)
−1, (3)
in the sense of non-negative definiteness of the difference matrix. In our framework, the parameter vector can
be the watermark signal or the secret key. (3) provides us a physical interpretation: the bigger the information
leakage is, the more accurate the estimation of the secret parameter might be.
The FIM is also an additive measure of the information, provided the observations are statistically indepen-
dent. For instance, suppose that the watermark signal has been added in No pieces of content whose extracted
vectors are independent and identically distributed as X ∼ N (0,RX). The observations are No watermarked
signals. Then,
log pO(o;w) = −1/2
No∑
j=1
(yj − w)TR−1X (yj − w) + const, (4)
ψ = −1/2
No∑
j=1
R−1X (yj − w) = −1/2
No∑
j=1
R−1X xj , (5)
FIM(w) = No/4R−1X E{xjxTj }R−1X = No/4R−1X . (6)
This models applications which detect presence of (and not decode) watermarks, or also template signals which
resynchronize content transformed by a geometric attack.
The mean square error E{‖θ̂−θ‖2} is the trace of Rˆθ, and thus its lower bound decreases in No
−1. However,
the rate No
? = Notr(FIM(θ)
−1) depends on the statistical model and consequently the kind of observations
(see section 4). It means that the estimation is significantly more accurate when the number of independent
observations increases of an order of No
?. The bigger No
?, the more difficult is the disclosure of the secret key.
This notion is close to the unicity distance of the above subsection. This is the reason why we use the same
notation No
? (although absolutely not defined in the same way).
3. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTITUTIVE METHOD
3.1. Mathematical model
In such a scheme, a binary vector x = (x(1) . . . x(Nv))
T is extracted from the content. For instance, in the famous
Burgett, Koch, and Zao technique [17], Nv pairs of DCT coefficients of an image are compared in absolute value.
The message to be hidden is a binary vector m = (m(1) . . .m(Nc))
T . The secret key is a list of Nc integers
k = [k(1), . . . , k(Nc)] with 1 ≤ k(`) ≤ Nv and k(`) 6= k(`′) if ` 6= `′. The embedding process copies x in y and
then substitutes the k(`)-th bit of y by the `-th bit of the message to be hidden: y(k(`)) = m(`). The inverse
extraction function maps back the watermarked vector y into the content. The decoding simply reads the bits
whose indices are given by the secret key.
Example 1. Nv = 8 and Nc = 4:
m = (1101) k = [2, 8, 5, 3]
x = (01001011) y = (01100011)
The uncertainty of the opponent is given by the entropy of the secret key that the embedder has randomly
selected among Nv!/(Nv − Nc)! possible keys. Thus:
H(K) = log2
Nv!
(Nv − Nc)!
(7)
3.2. Perfect covering
Theorem 3.1. As defined above, a substitutive watermarking scheme provides perfect covering. Proof: We can
model the substitutive watermarking as follows: let X be a binary Nv-length random vector, whose probability
mass function is uniform and equal to 2−Nv , and W be a binary Nv-length vector whose bits equal to 1 indicates
the bits to be flipped. For a given secret key, these ‘flipping’ bits are located at the same indices. If the message
to be hidden is a uniformly distributed random variable, W is finally independent from Y. Hence, we have
Y = X ⊕ W, giving:
pY(y) =
∑
w∈W
pY(y|w)pw(w) =
∑
w∈W
pX(y ⊕ w)pw(w)
= 2−Nv
∑
w∈W
pw(w) = 2
−Nv ,
pY(y|w) = pX(y ⊕ w) = 2−Nv .
The Bayes rule, pY(y|w)pW(w) = pW(w|y)pY(y), then gives pW(w) = pW(w|y).
3.3. Watermarked Only Attack
The substitutive method providing perfect covering, it is then very easy to show that I(Y;W) = 0, which implies
that I(Y;K) = 0. There is no information leakage, and the equivocation is equal to H(K) whatever the number
of observations. In a way, one can say that security level No
? = +∞.
However, note the utmost importance of the random messages assumption. If the message to be hidden is
fixed and X a random vector uniformly distributed, then the bits of Y stuck to the same value will disclose the
positions selected by the secret key. This might, for instance, indicate a security threat in fingerprinting (the
hidden message is the serial number of a buyer) of videos (a succession of several original video blocks, almost
independent) with a substitutive watermarking method.
3.4. Known Message Attack
If the opponent observes only one watermarked content y1 and its hidden message m1, the indices i such that
y1(i) = m1(`) are possible values of k(`). Denote S1(`) this set. As P (y1(i) = m1(`)|i 6= k(`)) = 1/2, there are
in expectation 1 + (Nv − 1)/2 elements in this set.
Now assume that the opponent observes several contents yNo and their hidden messages mNo . Set SNo(`) is
now defined by SNo(`) = {i : yj(i) = mj(`) ∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ No}. The probability that yj(i) = mj(`)∀j knowing that
i 6= k(`) is 1/2No. Thus, in expectation, |SNo | = 1 + (Nv − 1)/2No, and the equivocation about k(`) is equal to
log2(1 + 2
−No(Nv − 1)). However, there might be some overlapping between the Nc sets SNo(`), and the total
equivocation is smaller than the sum of the equivocations about k(`). As the calculus is quite complex, we stay
with this approximation:
H(K|(Y,M)No) . Nc log2(1 + 2−No(Nv − 1)). (8)
Shannon approximated this equivocation by Nc(log2(Nv−1)−No) when No  log2(Nv−1), and by 2−NoNc(Nv−
1)/ log(2) when No  log2(Nv −1) (see Fig. 4). He also approximated the unicity distance by No? = log2 Nv [15,
Sect. 14].
3.5. Known Original Attack
If the opponent observes only one watermarked content y1 and its original version x1, the indices i such that
x1(i) 6= y1(i) are possible values for the key samples. There are in expectation Nc/2 of such indices, as
p(x1(k(`)) = m1(`)) = 1/2. When the opponent observes j pairs, the set Sj = {` : ∃ j′, 1 ≤ j′ ≤ j, xj′ (`) 6= yj′(`)}
grows up. However, the event that an index revealed by a new pair was already known happens with a probability
|Sj−1|/Nc. This leads to the following series:
|Sj | = |Sj−1| + Nc(1 − |Sj−1|/Nc)/2 = Nc(1 − 2−j). (9)
Yet, it is not possible to assign a key sample to one of these indices. The equivocation is then the sum of
two terms: one is due to the Nc − |SNo | undisclosed indices to be picked up randomly among the remaining
candidates, the second one is due to the Nc! possible permutations of the chosen indices:
H(K|(Y,X)No) = log2
(
(Nv − d|SNo |e)!
(Nv − Nc)!(Nc − d|SNo |e)!
)
+ log2(Nc!). (10)
The security level (in the unicity distance sense) is not defined as the equivocation is always greater than zero.
This is due to the term log2(Nc!) reflecting the ambiguity in the order of the estimated key samples. We
preferably consider that within a number of observations greater than No
? = log2 Nc, the opponent learns all
the indices store in the secret key. This information is helpful for watermark jamming. He can also notice if two
hidden messages are the same. Yet, the ambiguity prevents him reading the hidden messages (he cannot put the
hidden bits in the right order), and writing hidden messages.
Fig. 4 gives a good synthesis of the results. In the WOA case, the opponent cannot get any information on
the key, and then cannot do anything. In the KMA case, he is able to completely disclose the key, and then
he will be able to read, erase, write or modify hidden messages. In the KOA case, he is able to recover the
components of the key but up to a permutation, and then he will be able to erase the hidden message, but not
to read or write a proper one.
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Figure 4. Substitutive watermarking: equivocations for WOA, KMA and KOA, against the number of observations.
Nc = 64, Nv = 512. The triangle and the square respectively mark the security levels for the KMA and KOA.
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF SPREAD SPECTRUM BASED TECHNIQUES
Spread spectrum is a military communication scheme invented during World War II [18]. It was designed
to be good at combatting interference due to jamming, hiding a signal by transmitting it at low power, and
achieving secrecy. These properties make spread spectrum very popular in nowadays digital watermarking.
Theoretical studies [5] and practical implementations [19] focus on the optimization of operational capacity-
robustness functions for a given embedding distortion.
4.1. Mathematical model
Denote by x a vector of Nv samples extracted from original content. The embedding is the addition of the
watermark signal which is the modulation of Nc private carriers u`:
w =
γ√
Nc
Nc∑
`=1
a(`)u`, (11)
where γ > 0 is a small gain fixing the embedding strength, and ‖u`‖ = 1, 1 ≤ ` ≤ Nc. The Watermark to
Content power Ratio (WCR) equals γ2σ2a/σ
2
x (or 10 log10(γ
2σ2a/σ
2
x) if expressed in dB). An inverse extraction
function puts back vector y = x + w into the media to produce the watermarked content.
Symbol vector a represents the message to be hidden/transmitted through content. In the case of a Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS), the modulation is a simple BPSK: a(`) = (−1)m(`), 1 ≤ ` ≤ Nc and σ2a = 1.
Yet, the scope of this model is far broader than the sole case of DSSS. Spread spectrum is a very common process
used to increase the signal to noise ratio by projecting signals on a smaller subspace of dimension Nc < Nv. This
also covers some side-informed watermarking techniques (sometimes called spread transform) [4,20–22]. Symbols
a(`) are then continuous real values (see Part Two).
For security reason, the carriers are private and issued by a pseudo-random generator fed by a seed. Many
people think the secret key is the seed. This is not false as the disclosure of the seed obviously gives the carriers
and allows the access to the watermarking channel. However, the knowledge of the carriers is sufficient and the
pirate has no interest in getting back to the seed. Hence, in this article, the secret key, defined as the object the
opponent is keen on revealing, is constituted by the carriers.
In the sequel, the security analysis considers several watermarked vectors yj , 1 ≤ j ≤ No, with different
embedded symbols aj = (aj(1) . . . aj(Nc))
T being linearly mixed by the Nv × Nc matrix U = (u1 . . .uNc). To
cancel inter-symbol interferences at the decoding side, carriers are two-by-two orthogonal vectors: UTU = INc ,
where IN is the N×N identity matrix. Index i denotes the ith samples of a signal, whereas j indices the different
signals. Thus, there are No watermarked vectors given by:
yj = xj +
γ√
Nc
Uaj , (12)
or, equivalently, concatenating No vectors xj (resp. yj or aj) column-wise in the Nv ×No matrix X (resp. Y or
the Nc × No matrix A):
Y = X + γ√
Nc
UA . (13)
4.2. Perfect covering
Assume that X ∼ N (0,RX) and that w is picked up randomly among sequences distributed as N (0,RW).
Then, pY = N (0,RX + RW) and pY|W=w = N (w,RX). The Bayes rule shows that spread spectrum based
watermarking does not provide perfect covering. Even if the attacker has only access to watermarked pieces
of content, some information about the watermark signal is leaking from these observations. The following
subsections investigate whether the opponent can, thanks to this leakage on the watermark signal, gain some
knowledge about the secret carriers.
4.3. Known Message Attack
In this subsection, the opponent has access to (watermarked signals/hidden messages) pairs. Moreover, only
the DSSS technique (i.e., a BPSK modulation) is considered. Our attack may not work with side information
embedding because the opponent still ignores symbols a, as they also depend on the original signal. Formally,
the observations considered in this subsection are (y,a)No .
Assume, for simplicity reason, that each occurrence of random vector X is independently drawn from
N (0, σ2xINv). The following theoretical derivations can be adapted to colored original signals and even non
stationary original signals [23]. Another motivation is that, according to the Power Spectrum Constraint [24],
watermark signals usually adopt the statistical structure of host signals in order to increase their robustness, i.e.
RW = γ2RX. Hence, the Karhunen-Loève Transform simultaneously whitens both signals.
The likelihood is the probability of observing the data yNo , while knowing the model:
L(yNo) =
1
(
√
2πσx)NoNv
e
„
− 1
2σ2x
PNo
j=1
‖yj− γ√Nc Uaj‖
2
«
, (14)
and the log-likelihood is log L = K − 12σ2x
∑No
j=1 ‖yj − γ√NcUaj)‖
2. The opponent wants to estimate the private
carriers uNc . So, the derivative implied in the FIM is ψ = ∂ log L/∂(uT1 . . .u
T
Nc
)T with
∂ log L
∂u`
=
γ
σ2x
√
Nc
No∑
j=1
aj(`)xj . (15)
The expectation of the products gives the following Nv × Nv sub-blocks:
E
(
∂ log L
∂u`
)(
∂ log L
∂uk
)T
=
γ2
Ncσ2x
(Fuu)`,k =
γ2
Ncσ2x
No∑
j=1
aj(`)aj(k)INv . (16)
The FIM is then the following block matrix:
FIM =
γ2
Ncσ2x


(Fuu)1,1 . . . (Fuu)1,Nc
...
...
(Fuu)Nc,1 . . . (Fuu)Nc,Nc

 =
γ2
Ncσ2x
Fuu No→+∞−→ No
γ2σ2a
Ncσ2x
INvNc . (17)
With a BPSK modulation, σa = 1. The information leakage is linear with the number of observations, thanks
to the assumption of independence, and the rate is given by the Watermark to Content power Ratio per carrier
γ2/Ncσ
2
x. The security level of spread spectrum based watermarking techniques against KMA is No
? = Ncσ
2
x/γ
2
of (watermarked signals/hidden messages) pairs.
4.4. Known Original Attack
The opponent observes (y,x)No . The vector difference of each observation j gives the source signals aj being
linearly mixed by the Nv × Nc matrix U :
dj = yj − xj =
γ√
Nc
Uaj . (18)
Assume that No ≥ Nc and that there are at least Nc linearly independent messages. The difference matrix
D = Y − X ∝ UA is then full rank, and Span (D) = Span (U). The observation of difference vectors discloses
the secret subspace Span (U), provided symbol matrix A is full rank. However, this doesn’t reveal the private
carriers. Denote by E a matrix whose columns constitute an orthonormal basis of the subspace Span (D). We
have E = UPT , with P a unitary Nc × Nc matrix. A priori, there is no reason for which P = INc . Hence,
decoding the symbols with matrix E gives the following mixture v = √NcETd/γ = Pa. This is a blind source
separation (BSS) problem with a square mixing matrix. Comon proved that it is possible to identify P (and
thus U), but up to a permutation and scale ambiguity, only if at most one source is Gaussian [25]. The scale
ambiguity is indeed a sign ambiguity in our problem, as we set UTU = I. In conclusion, at best, the mixing
matrix is identified by Û = ΠΣU with Π a permutation matrix and Σ a diagonal matrix whose elements are
±1. At best for the opponent, the secret carriers are identified up to a signed permutation (i.e., matrix ΠΣ)
ambiguity.
The likelihood to observe v for a given matrix P is p(v;P) = | detP|−1pA(P−1v), and its score is:
∂
∂P log p(v;P) = −P
−T + P−Tχ(P−1v)vTP−T , (19)
with χ(x) = − ∂
∂x
log pA(x) [26]. The asymptotic accuracy of the estimations is known to be only dependent
on the symbols distribution, and especially on its non-Gaussianity. As, in our case, symbols are i.i.d., denote
by χ(.) the score function of aj(i), and by χn(.) the score function of a Gaussian random variable sharing the
same variance (i.e., χn(x) = x/σ
2
a). The trace of the Cramér-Rao Bound is then shown to be proportional to
(g−1 + 1/2)/2No for large No [27], with g defined as:
g =
E{(χ(a) − χn(a))2}
E{χn(a)2}
. (20)
However, g is not above bounded and tends to +∞ when the symbols tend to have a discrete or bounded support.
This is typically the case in watermarking, as the embedder would not allow the use of unbounded symbols for a
perceptual distortion reason. In the case of discrete symbols, error free mixing matrix recovery is possible within
a finite number of observations. For instance, [28] shows a workable algorithm needing No > Nc
2 observations
for BPSK symbols. In the case of bounded support symbols, the trace of CRB decreases at a faster rate than
1/No [27, 29].
4.5. Watermarked Only Attack
In this section, the sources are unknown and can then be regarded as nuisance parameters [30, 31]. Vector ψ
equals then ∂ log L/∂(uT1 . . .u
T
Nc
aT1 . . .a
T
No
)T , with the following Nc × 1 vectors:
∂ log L
∂aj
=
γ
σ2x
√
Nc
UT xj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , No}. (21)
The expectations of the products give the following sub-blocks:
E
(
∂ log L
∂aj
∂ log L
∂ak
T
)
=
γ2
Ncσ2x
(Faa)j,k =
γ2
Ncσ2x
INcδj,k
E
(
∂ log L
∂u`
∂ log L
∂aj
T
)
=
γ2
Ncσ2x
(Fua)`,j =
γ2
Ncσ2x
(Fau)Tj,`,
where δi,j is the Kronecker function. We write with explicit notation:
FIM =
γ2
Ncσ2x
[
Fuu Fua
Fau Faa
]
. (22)
Note that Faa = INoNc . The Cramér-Rao Bound for estimated Vect(U) = (uT1 , . . . ,uTNc)T is CRB(Vect(U)) =
Ncσ
2
x
γ2
F̃−1uu , with F̃uu = (Fuu −FuaF−1aa Fau) = (Fuu −FuaFau). It is known that, in the general case, F̃−1uu ≥ F−1uu
(i.e. F̃−1uu − F−1uu is non negative definite). In other words, nuisance parameters render the estimation of U less
accurate [26]. But, the situation is even worse here as the FIM becomes singular. Indeed:
(FuaFau)`,k =
No∑
j=1
(Fua)`,j(Fau)j,k =
No∑
j=1
aj(`)aj(k)UUT , (23)
therefore F̃uu = AAT ⊗ (INv − UUT ). As (INv − UUT )uk = 0, F̃uu is singular.
This problem stems from two facts. First, we did not integrate some constraints during our derivation.
Especially, we know that uT` uk = δ`,k. [30] gives an alternative expression for the bound in the case where the
unconstrained problem is unidentifiable and the FIM non invertible.
However, the integration of the above-mentioned constraints in the derivation of the FIM is not sufficient for
Nc > 1. The second fact is that an ambiguity remains about the order and ‘phase’ of the carriers. The system is
only identifiable up to a signed permutation. The case Nc = 1 is interesting, as constraint integration removes
the FIM singularity because the ambiguity of the permutation does not exist.
4.5.1. One carrier
The parameter vector to be estimated is composed of the unique carrier and the hidden symbols as nuisance
parameters: (UTA). Please, note that UT and A are row vectors in this case. The constraint on u1 is: (‖u1‖2 −
1)/2 = 0. The sequel is only the strict application of [30]. The 1 × (Nv + No) gradient matrix of the constraint
is equal to G = (uT1 0TNo), where 0N is a N zero vector. There exists a matrix H ∈ R(Nv+No)×(Nv+No−1) whose
columns form a basis for the nullspace of G, that is, such that GH = 0. In our case, one particular choice of H
is readily verified to be:
H =
[
U⊥ 0
0 INo
]
, (24)
with U⊥ being a basis of the complementary subspace of Span(u1) in RNv . Then, according to [30, Th. 1],
the Cramér-Rao Bound under the above-mentioned constraint is CRB(UTA) = H(HT FIM H)−1HT . With our
choice of H, this yields:
CRB(UTA) = σ
2
x
γ2
[
(AAT )−1U⊥U⊥T 0
0 INo
]
, (25)
and we finally get:
CRB(UT ) = σ
2
x
γ2
(AAT )−1U⊥U⊥T No→+∞−→ σ
2
x
Noσ2aγ
2
U⊥U⊥T . (26)
4.5.2. Nc carriers (Nc > 1)
The ambiguity renders the Fisher Information Matrix singular, even when considering the constraints. However,
Part Two shows that, in practice, the opponent builds noisy estimation of the carriers up to a signed permutation.
A possibility in [31], is to pretend that the opponent knows Nm messages (for instance {a`}Nm`=1), in order to
artificially remove the ambiguity. This adds NmNc constraints of the type: âj(`) = aj(`). At the end, calculation
leads to:
CRB(Vect(U)) = Ncσ
2
x
γ2
HuuB−1HuuT , (27)
with B the Nc(Nv−Nm)×Nc(Nv−Nm) matrix whose (Nv−Nm)×(Nv−Nm) blocks are (B)`,k = (AAT )`,kU⊥T` U⊥k −
(ANm:NoANm:NoT )`,kU⊥Tl UUTU⊥k , and Huu the NcNv ×Nc(Nv −1) diagonal matrix whose Nv × (Nv −1) blocks
on diagonal are (Huu)`,` = U⊥` . In these expressions, the columns of U⊥` form an orthonormal basis of the
complementary subspace of Span (u`), and ANm:No = (aNm+1 . . .aNo). However, the minimal number Nm to
remove the ambiguity depends on the symbols’ pdf [31].
Facing the difficulty of finding the right parameter Nm and the cumbersome calculus, we prefer to approximate
the information leakage about a carrier by (26), where γ2 is replaced by the power per carrier γ2/Nc. The security
level is then No
? = Ncσ
2
x/σ
2
aγ
2 which is, by the way, coherent with (27). This result is quite surprising because
the security level is the same against KMA and WOA. Yet, the estimation of the secret carriers remains up to a
signed permutation in the WOA.
